# A New Regulator for Advanced AI Systems

The Problem – National and Global Security Risks from Al Development

Al that is capable of surpassing human intelligence across many domains is being developed rapidly and without adequate control. Nobel Prize winners, leading Al scientists, and even CEOs of Al companies have warned that advanced Al poses an extinction risk to humanity. Current UK legislation lacks binding, enforceable regulations to manage these risks, making it urgent to establish a framework for oversight over powerful Al development.

The UK led 28 governments, including the USA and EU, in <u>agreeing</u> to intervene in AI development posing severe risks, and secured <u>commitments</u> from leading companies to restrict development in cases of unacceptable risks. Secretary of State Peter Kyle <u>stated</u> that Labour will work to make these commitments <u>mandatory</u>. However, the sector remains unregulated and company commitments remain voluntary.

### The Solution – Establishing an Independent Al regulator

In 2023 the UK Government established the AI Security Institute (AISI) to advance our understanding of advanced AI and enable its governance. We propose **establishing AISI as an independent AI regulator** under the Department of Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT), with the authority to regulate, oversee, and enforce safety standards for frontier AI models. Such a move from advisory to statutory body for AISI has already been <u>promised by the UK government in their response to the AI Opportunities Action Plan</u>. This regulator would ensure that companies developing AI models above certain compute thresholds and general intelligence benchmarks comply with rigorous safety protocols. This would allow the UK to harness the benefits of practical AI while mitigating risks posed by the uncontrolled development of superintelligent AI.

Key aspects of the AI regulator mandate would include:

- <u>Licensing frontier AI developers</u> to ensure AI models are safe before, during, and after development.
- <u>Prohibiting dangerous AI capabilities</u>, such as unauthorised replication, environmental breakout, and autonomous self-improvement.
- Oversight of high-computation AI models and applications that present catastrophic or extinction level risks.
- <u>Establishing safety standards</u> for the design, development, deployment, and monitoring of AI systems.

## The Licensing Framework

At the core of the regulator's power is a **three-tiered licensing system** aimed at managing the development and deployment of frontier Al models above critical compute thresholds. These licences ensure that only Al developers and operators that meet safety requirements can proceed with their work.

#### 1. Training Licence

For AI developers aiming to train models that exceed a set computational power threshold, set at 10^25 FLOP. Applicants must present detailed risk mitigation plans matching the commitments made at the Seoul AI Summit, including shutdown procedures for AI systems that pose unacceptable levels of risk.

#### 2. Compute Licence

Required for cloud service providers and data centres operating above 10^17 FLOP/s. The compute licence ensures that large-scale computational power is not misused for unregulated AI development. Licensees must implement hardware tracking and know-your-customer (KYC) requirements to maintain transparency and security over computing resources.

#### 3. Application Licence

For developers seeking to develop applications using a licensed model. It would ensure that modifications to approved AI models remain compliant with safety regulations, particularly when model capabilities are enhanced. Automatic approval would apply to applications with no significant capability upgrades.

## **Prohibiting Dangerous AI Capabilities**

The regulator would have the power to enforce prohibitions on **specific high-risk Al behaviours**, ensuring that even models operating below regulatory thresholds do not engage in hazardous activities. These would constitute the unacceptable risk thresholds that governments have committed to identify in the <u>Seoul agreement</u>. These prohibited capabilities include:

- No Superintelligent Als: Al systems must not surpass human intelligence in general tasks.
- No Unbounded Als: Al systems for which a robust safety case cannot be made regarding capabilities of concern should not be developed or deployed, ensuring they remain predictable and controllable.
- <u>No Environmental Breakout</u>: Al systems must not escape their designated environments or access external systems or networks, even with authorisation, if the regulator deems the degree or scope unsafe by design.
- No Als Improving Als: Al systems should not improve or develop other Al systems, particularly those not directly written by humans.

# Governance and Flexibility

The regulator's governance would remain flexible to adapt to future AI developments and risks, with the establishment of an **AI Security Board**, which would be responsible for defining key regulatory thresholds and capabilities for licensing requirements, and have the power to **order the shutdown of AI models or applications.** 

A newly created **Scientific Advisory Group** would provide expert input on emerging Al capabilities, risks, and security measures. This advisory group would work closely with the Board to ensure that regulatory decisions are scientifically informed and aligned with global safety standards.